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Concession of four the Cours study)

There is evidence of at least four potential friction and division elements in the MSR. They are:

- 1. Rivelries between personalities—for power, for Stalia's fewer, and because of personality conflicts.
- 2. Differing economic theories on the proper division of production between expital, communers and military goods, on pros and come of trading with foreigners, and on other economic questions.
- 3. Conflict between Old Balsberiks and new, Many of the old have had normal contacts with foreign countries and are not as anti-US or as isolationist as the new. At present, the most likely successors to Stalin are Molotov (Old Balsbevik) and Malenkov and Perin (New). No one of them can succeed to the leadership without the support of one other, yet one expert says, "The Old Balsberike will hang together; they will never subsit to leadership by the New."
- A. Some elements of the Army. The Communist Party has not been ubelly successful in making the armed forces politically reliable. Many soldiers are of peasant origin; many officers are devoted only to Bussia, not to Communism. The Army does not symbolise repression to the Eussian people and is not feared or distrust trusted by them. There is evidence that the Coviet rulers distrust the Army's reliability, as evidenced by the purges of high officers.

the heavy loading of political commisses and informers through the ranks and the reported highly-armed Secret Army within the Army. It is an axiom that the armed forces are the ultimate key to the power and marrival of a distatorship. The Soviet Army's special position and character may be of great eignificance when Stalin dies.

There may be other insues—whether to risk war to expand Community, for example—on which Soviet leaders doubtless disagree, but lack of reliable intelligence on them makes disquesion pure speculation.

When Stalin dies, there will be dissetisfaction and tension, but the Presidium, knowing the risks of revealing such dissension, will probably hold together and effect an orderly transfer of power, at least initially. The nature of Stalin's dictatorship, however, indicates the probability of an eventual struggle for power between Molecov, Seria, Malenkov and possibly Bulgania.

A Presiding struggle would offer the U.S. the epportunity to

(1) attempt to widen the split; (2) use the split to insite a second
schism in the Russian population or the military, for example;

(3) aggregate the internal griss by precipitating an external oneperhaps in the UK or in a satellite erea.

Any plan to exploit the death of Stalin in the U.S. interest would have to be a day-to-day, Clemible plan and would require taking the onl-culated rick that U.S. action might unify the very elements we were trying to shirld Processy; execution of a plan would require continuous collection of information about USE leaders and the establishment of effective covert chancels of execution with and within the USE.

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
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- 1. Recognize Stalin's death as a news event without the cus
 - distatorship compared to which the Coars' seems mild. Disseminate this view by a Presidential speech, pronouncement in the US, and by VOA, DFE and other available means.

 2. Express one regret—that Stalin never visited any desporacy
 - 2. Extress an regret—that Stalin never visited any descoracy so never knew the truth about these-and go on to the feelings of the American people toward the Sussian people.
 - 3. In a high-level speech, emphasize that Stalin's death is fuscia's hour of decision. She is great and strong, and can take this opportunity to lift the Bron Curtain and join the world in a empaign for peace.
 - A. In a high-level pronouncement, indicate that the U.S. wants peace and is ready and waiting for Funcia's answer.
 - U. S. aims some to be irreconcilably opposed to Malenkov's and Paris's—Stalin's likely successors. It follows that U. S. political warfare must therefore aim first at destroying the power of Malenkov and Paris. This effort can start now, before Stalin dies. The best means

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covert means. Unless some carefully planned and sustained actions are taken the death of Stalls cannot reset, except by sheer accident, in the 25X1C interest of the U.S.



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